Proposition 40: Ideas that spring from adequate ideas in the human mind are also adequate themselves.
Proof: This proposition is self—evident.
This means that (2.11. Coroll.) an idea is in the divine intellect which is from God as the essence of the human mind.
Note 1: I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which:
are common to all men, and
form the basis of our reasonings.
But there are other causes of certain notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours.
so we can know which notions are useful and which are not.
Furthermore, we should see:
what notions are common to everyone,
what notions are only clear and distinct to those unshackled by prejudice.
We should detect the notions which are ill—founded.
We should discern whence the notions called secondary derived their origin.
Consequently, we should discern:
the axioms on which they are founded, and
other points of interest connected with these questions.
But I will skip this subject because:
I have set it aside for another treatise and
The reader might become weary by excess wordiness.
Nevertheless, I will briefly set down the causes, whence are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being, Thing, Something.
These terms are due to the fact that the human body is limited
It can only distinctly form a certain number of images within itself at the same time.
(I explained in the 2.17 note what an image is.)
If this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused.
If this number is largely exceeded, all images will become entirely confused one with another.
Thus, (from 2. Prop. 17 Coroll., and 18) the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body can form images simultaneously.
When the images become confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction.
It will comprehend them under one attribute of Being, Thing, etc.
The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that:
images are not always equally vivid and
from other analogous causes
We just need to explain one cause
All may be reduced to this: that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused.
From similar causes arise 'general' notions such as man, horse, dog, etc.
This is because so many images are formed simultaneously in the human mind.
The powers of imagination break down
The mind loses count of small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, etc.) and their definite number.
It only distinctly imagines that, in which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree.
For that is the point, in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body.
The mind expresses this by the name 'man'.
The mind predicates this of an infinite number of particular individuals because it cannot imagine the definite number of individuals.
However, we must bear in mind that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way.
But they vary in each person according to
how the body has been most often affected
how the mind most easily imagines or remembers
For instance, those who admire the stature of man, will by the name of man, understand an animal of erect stature.
Those who have been used to regard some other attribute, will form a different general image of man
For instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two—footed animal without feathers, a rational animal.
Thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body
This is why so many controversies have arisen among philosophers, who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them.
Note 2: In many cases, we perceive and form our general notions:
From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses (2.29. Coroll.).
I call such perceptions as 'knowledge' from mere experience.
(2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas on them, similar to those through which we imagine things (2.18 note).
I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.
(3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (2.38 Coroll., 2.39 and Coroll. and 2.40.)
I call this reason and knowledge of the second kind.
There is a third kind of knowledge called 'intuition'.
Intuition comes from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.
A single example will illustrate all three kinds of knowledge.
Three numbers are given for finding a fourth number, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first.
Traders multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by the first either because:
they have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master without any proof, or
they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the 19th proposition of the 7th book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals.
 A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
But this is not needed with very simple numbers.
For instance, 1 x 2 x 3 are given.
Everyone can see that the fourth proportional is 6.
This is much clearer, because we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio, which the first bears to the second.
Proposition 41. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsehood.
Knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.
Proof: We have (in the foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate and confused, to the knowledge of the first kind.
Therefore, this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsehood (2.35).
Furthermore, we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are adequate.
Therefore, these kinds are necessarily true (2.34). Q.E.D.
Proposition 42: Knowledge of the second and third kinds teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.
Proof: This proposition is self—evident.
A person who knows how to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea of true and false.
That is (2.40. note 2), he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.
Proposition 43: A person who has a true idea simultaneously:
knows that he has a true idea, and
cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived.
Proof: A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God, in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind (2.11. Coroll.).
Let us suppose that there is in God, as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea A.
The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God.
It must be referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by 2.20, whereof the proof is of universal application).
But the idea A is supposed to be referred to God, as he is displayed through the human mind.
Therefore, the idea of the idea A must be referred to God in the same way.
That is (by 2.11 Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind, which has the adequate idea A.
Therefore he, who has an adequate idea or knows a thing truly (2.34), must at the same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge. Q.E.D.
Note: I explained in the note to 2.21. what is meant by the idea of an idea.
A person who has a true idea knows that a true idea involves the highest certainty.
For to have a true idea is only another expression for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible.
No one can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of thinking or the very act of understanding.
Who can know that he understands anything, unless he do first understand it?
In other words, who can know that he is sure of a thing, unless he be first sure of that thing?
Further, what can there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a standard of truth?
As light displays both itself and darkness, so truth is a standard both of itself and of falsity.
If a true idea is distinguished from a false idea as it is said to agree with its object, a true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea (since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);
Consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any advantage over him who has only false ideas.
Further, how can men have false ideas?
Lastly, how can anyone be sure, that he has ideas which agree with their objects?
The difference between a true idea and a false idea is plain.
A true idea is related to the false idea, as being is to not—being (2.35).
I have explained very clearly the causes of falsehood in 2.19. and 2.35 with the note.
It reveals the difference between a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas.
How can a man be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects?
His knowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with its object.
In other words, that truth is its own standard.
We may add that our mind, as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (2.11. Coroll.).
Therefore, the mind's clear and distinct ideas are as necessarily true as God's ideas.
Proposition 44: It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary.
Proof: It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly (2.41), namely (1. Ax. 6.), as they are in themselves—that is (1.29.), not as contingent, but as necessary. Q.E.D. Corollary 1: It follows that it is only through our imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the future or the past, as contingent. Note: I will briefly explain how this way of looking at things arises.
The mind (2.17 and Coroll.) always regards things as present to itself, even though they do not exist, until some causes arise which exclude their existence and presence.
If the human body (2.18) has been affected by two external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway remember the other.
That is, it will regard both as present to itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence and presence.
We imagine time, from the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others, some more quickly, some at equal speed.
Thus, let us suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that today he again sees Peter in the morning.
As soon as he sees the morning light (2. Prop. 18), he will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day.
In other words, he will imagine a complete day.
Together with his imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon.
That is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a future time.
On the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past time.
If on some other evening, the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together.
For the child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them, not both together.
His imagination will therefore waver.
With the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one, then the other.
That is, he will imagine them in the future, neither of them as certain, but both as contingent.
This wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination is concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in relation to time past or time present.
Consequently, we may imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time present, past, or future.
Corollary 2: It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis specie). Proof: It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as necessary (2.44).
Reason perceives this necessity of things (2.41) truly—that is (1. Ax. 6), as it is in itself.
But (1.16) this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God.
Therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.
We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (2.38), which answer to things common to all, and which (2.37) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing:
which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity.
Proposition 45: Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing actually existing, necessarily involves God's eternal and infinite essence. Proof: The idea of a particular thing actually existing necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the said thing (2.8).
Now particular things cannot be conceived without God (1.15).
But, inasmuch as (2.6) they have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas must necessarily involve (1. Ax. 4.) the conception of the attributes of those ideas—that is (1.6), the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.
Note: By existence I do not here mean duration—that is, existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a certain form of quantity.
I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of God's nature (1.16.).
I am speaking of the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in God.
For although each particular thing be conditioned by another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. 1.24. Coroll.).
Proposition 46: The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect. Proof: The proof of the last proposition is universal; and whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.), will involve God's eternal and infinite essence.
Wherefore, that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole; therefore (2.38) this knowledge will be adequate. Q.E.D.
Proposition 47: The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Proof: The human mind has ideas (2.22), from which (2.23) it perceives itself and its own body (2.19.) and external bodies (2.16. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually existing;
Therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.
Note.—Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known to all.
Now as all things are in God, and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to 2.40., and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak in Part 5.
Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as they have of general notions, because:
they are unable to imagine God as they do bodies, and
also because they have associated the name 'God' with images of things that they are habitually see, as they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they are, men, and continually affected by external bodies.
Many errors, in truth, can be traced to this head: that we do not apply names to things rightly.
For instance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that assigned by mathematicians.
So again, when men make mistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and another on the paper.
If we could see into their minds, they do not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the paper.
If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear.
Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret the meaning of others.
As a matter of fact, they flatly contradict themselves.
They assume now one side, now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider mistaken and absurd in their opponents.
Proposition 48: In the mind there is no absolute or free will.
But the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity.
Proof: The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (2.11), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (1.17 Coroll. 2).
In other words, it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by 1.28) it must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another, &c. Q.E.D.
Note: In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc.
Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms, such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things.
Thus, the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul.
The cause which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in the Appendix to Part 1.
By the will to affirm and decide, I mean the faculty, not the desire.
I mean the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing.
After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular instances on which they are based, we must ask whether volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things.
We must inquire whether there is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, an idea, involves.
On which subject see the following proposition, and 2. Def. 3, lest the idea of pictures should suggest itself.
For by ideas, I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.
Proposition 49: There is no volition or affirmation and negation in the mind, save that which an idea, as it is an idea, involves. Proof: There is no absolute faculty of positive or negative volition in the mind.
There are only particular volitions, namely, this or that affirmation, and this or that negation.
Let us conceive a particular volition: the mode of thinking whereby the mind affirms that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.
This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a triangle.
Without the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived.
It is the same say that the concept A must involve the concept B, as it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B.
Further, this affirmation cannot be made (2. Ax. 3) without the idea of a triangle.
Therefore, this affirmation can neither exist nor be conceived, without the idea of a triangle.
Again, this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation: that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles.
Wherefore, and vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither exist nor be conceived without this affirmation.
Therefore, this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing besides.
What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have selected it at random) may be said of any other volition: that it is nothing but an idea. Q.E.D.
Corollary: Will and understanding are one and the same.
Proof: Will and understanding are nothing beyond the individual volitions and ideas (2.48 and note).
But a particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same (by the foregoing Prop.).
Therefore, will and understanding are one and the same. Q.E.D.
Note: We have thus removed the cause which is commonly assigned for error.
We have shown above, that falsehood consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused.
Wherefore, a false idea, as it is false, does not involve certainty.
When we say that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain.
We only say that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false, as there are no reasons, which should cause his imagination to waver (see 2.44 note).
Thus, although the man is assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say that he is certain.
For by certainty we mean something positive (2.43 and note), not merely the absence of doubt.
To remove every scruple, I will point out some of the advantages which follow therefrom.
They will be better appreciated in Part 5.
To fully explain the foregoing proposition, I will:
draw attention to a few additional points and
answer the objections advanced against our doctrine.
I warn my readers to:
accurately distinguish between:
an idea, or conception of the mind, and
the images of things which we imagine.
distinguish between the idea and words we use to signify things.
Images, words, and ideas are by many persons either:
entirely confused together, or
not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,
Hence, people are generally ignorant, how absolutely necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, for:
philosophic purposes and
the wise ordering of life.
Those who think that ideas consist in images formed in us by contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of our will.
They thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel.
Filled with this misconception, they do not see that an idea, as an idea, involves an affirmation or negation.
Those who confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or deny.
This misconception will easily be laid aside by one who reflects on the nature of knowledge.
He sees that it does not involve the conception of extension.
He will therefore clearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not consist in the image of anything, nor in words.
The essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions, which does not involve the conception of thought.
Next, I will consider the objections against our doctrine.
The first objection is from those who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, and is different from it.
They think so because they assert that:
they do not need to increase their faculty of affirmation or negation, in order to affirm or negate an infinity of things which we do not perceive.
they need to increase their faculty of understanding.
The will is thus distinguished from the intellect.
The will becomes finite and the intellect infinite.
Experience seems to teach us clearly that we can suspend our judgment before affirming or negating the things we perceive.
This is confirmed by the fact that no one is deceived, as he perceives anything, but only as he assents or dissents.
He who feigns a winged horse, does not admit that a winged horse exists.
That is, he is not deceived, unless he admits that a winged horse does exist.
Therefore, nothing seems to be taught more clearly by experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different from the faculty of understanding.
Thirdly, one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality than another.
In other words, we do not seem to need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than for affirming, that what is false is true.
However, we have seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others.
This also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and the will.
Fourthly, if man does not act from free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass?
Will he perish of hunger and thirst?
If I say that he would, I shall seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather than an actual man.
If I say that he would not, he would then determine his own action, and would consequently possess the faculty of going and doing whatever he liked.
Other objections might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible.
To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding be meant only clear and distinct ideas.
But I deny that the will has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of forming conceptions.
nor do I see why the faculty of volition should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling.
For, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an infinite number of bodies.
If there is an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor, consequently, by any faculty of volition.
But it may still be urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have already.
If God wished to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of other entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.
The will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we explain all particular volitions.
In other words, it is common to all such volitions.
Our opponents maintain that this idea, common or universal to all volitions, is a faculty.
It is little to be wondered at that they assert that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding.
For what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an infinite number of individuals.
To the second objection I reply by denying that we have a free power of suspending our judgment.
When we say that anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does not perceive the matter in question adequately.
Therefore, suspension of judgment is strictly speaking, a perception, and not free will.
To illustrate the point, let us suppose a boy imagines a horse and nothing else.
He will necessarily regard the horse as present since:
this imagination involves the horse's existence (2.17. Coroll.), and
the boy does not perceive anything which would exclude the horse's existence.
He will not be able to doubt of its existence, although he is not certain of it.
We have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams.
No one would maintain that while he is dreaming, he has the free power of:
suspending his judgment on the things in his dream, and
bringing it about that he should not dream those things he sees in his dreams.
Yet even in dreams we suspend our judgment when we dream that we are dreaming.
Further, no one can be deceived, so far as actual perception extends—that is, I grant that the mind's imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (2.17. note).
But I deny, that a man does not, in the act of perception, make any affirmation.
For what is the perception of a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings?
If the mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would regard the same as present to itself.
It cannot doubt its existence.
No faculty of dissent, unless the imagination of a winged horse is joined to an idea which precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject.
I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection:
that the will is something universal which is predicated of all ideas, and
that the will only signifies that which is common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate essence must, therefore, as it is thus conceived in the abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea's essence:
for, in this respect, particular affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas.
For instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs from the affirmation which involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.
I absolutely deny that we need an equal power of thinking to affirm that that which is true is true, and to affirm that that which is false is true.
If we regard the mind, these two affirmations are in the same relation to one another as being and not—being.
for there is nothing positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of falsehood (2.35 note, and 47 note).
We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived when we confuse:
universals with singulars, and
the entities of reason and abstractions with realities.
As for the fourth objection, I admit that a man placed in the equilibrium described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from him) would die of hunger and thirst.
If I am asked, whether such an man should be considered an ass rather than a man.
I answer, that I do not know:
how a man, who hangs himself, should be considered or
how we should consider children, fools, madmen, etc.
It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this doctrine as bearing on conduct.
This may be easily gathered from what has been said.
The doctrine is good.
It teaches us to:
act solely according to God's decree, and
partake in the Divine nature, and so much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and understand God more.
Such a doctrine completely tranquilizes our spirit.
It also shows us that our highest happiness or blessedness is solely in the knowledge of God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us.
We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as for having endured the direst slavery;
as if virtue and the service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.
2. It teaches us how we should conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters not in our power, and do not follow from our nature.
It shows us that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind.
We see that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles.
3. This doctrine raises social life, as it teaches us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry with any.
It tells us that each should be content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any womanish pity, favour, or superstition.
It should solely be by the guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as I will show in Part 3.
4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth.
It teaches how citizens should be governed and led, not to become slaves, but so that they may freely do the best things.
I have thus fulfilled my promise at the beginning of this note.
I have clearly explained the nature and properties of the human mind at sufficient length, considering the subject's difficulty.
I have laid a foundation which can be the basis of many excellent, useful, and essential conclusions